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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 15714

-vsBERNARD

SANDOVAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged ¥ith the crime of aggravated
robbery, in violation of § 76-6-302, Utah Criminal Code.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant and two co-defendants were tried jointly
on January 12-13, 1978, before a jury in the Third District
lD'J:-t of 03.l t

~a:::: Co'_::-,ty·.

T;1e Court belmv denied appellant's

motion for severance and/or mistrial and subsequently denied
his motion for a new trial.

Appellant and co-defendants were

all found guilty of the crime of aggravated robbery, a felony
of the first degree.
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l\_ppellant vras sentenced to a terrn of five years

life but was granted a stay of sentence and placed on probJ+ ·,

I

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment

of~

lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant and co-defendants Carter and Morishiu
were charged with having committed the crime of aggravated
robbery on or about the 31st day of March, 1977.

(R. p. 11)

On January 12, 1978, appellant and co-defendants were

joint!~

brought to trial before a jury in the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County.
After respondent rested its case, appellant's coun;,i
I

did not call appellant to the stand, but rested his case

I

without exercising appellant's right to testify.
Counsel for co-defendant Morishita then stated
during his opening statement that he would call appellant to
the stand to testify (R. p. 337).

Counsel for appellant

obj2c:ted c.~r:- t:-ie court sustained t::e objRction..

IJ'hP r•nilft

' p~"n ad·~
<:h c-a J_,
.
t-o
tn
'"' on
" l. _,
c.n•.o Jury
_ a" i' s__re•:J c~r.--1
_, ~ -t-n'
- p_ r;-,~_
"'-' tter, s ca tir.y

t:.

a defendant could not be called to the stand involuntarily.
(R.

p.

437).
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A conference was subsequently held at the side bar
during 1,1hich the court informed counsel for co-defendant
Morishita that he could not call appellant Sandoval to the
stand to testify.
st.ute~l

Appellant's counsel at this time also

tho.t appello.nt r.,;oulQ

no~

cake the stand.

(R.

p.

203)

After counsel for co-defendant Morishita completed
his opening statement, the court directed him to call his
f~st

witness.

At that time, counsel for Morishita called

appellant Sandoval to the stand.

(R. p. 337).

Counsel for

appellant objected and the objection was sustained by the
court.
Counsel for appellant then moved for a severance
and/or mistrial and his motion was denied.

(R. p. 337).

Subsequent to the trial, counsel for appellant filed
a motion for a new trial
by the court.

(R. p. 158), which motion was denied

(R. p. 166).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
~~E

TRIAL

.~=~:-~-~

coon~

~:is

DID NOT ERR NOR

~I8 1 ~~~-~-T'I()~-:

s LO~ roi:;
AND/Oa MISTRIAL.

!:.:'?~'.i~L_=').:;T

1

I;-- iJ£i\YI7'·:c.:
F02. .3Ei/LRi~.N(~E

Appellant contends that the trial court should
have granted his motion for severance and/or mistrial on the
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grounds that appellant was prejudiced by the conduct of
counsel for co-defendant Morishita.
Al though appellant concedes that the announcenent
by counsel for co-defendant Morishita of his intention

~

call appellant to the stand was most likely in3u[ficient

~

prejudice the jury, he claims that the subsequent actual
calling of appellant by counsel for Morishita focused ilie
attention of the jury on appellant's failure to testify in
the same manner as if direct comment had been made.
In support of his contention, appellant cites the
case of Deluna v. United States, 308 F.

2d 140 (5th Cir. 1%i

reh. denied 324 F. 2d 375 (1963), which can be distinguished
from the case at bar.

In Deluna, the comments made by the

co-defendant's attorney were several and included

contr~t~

his client's willingness to take the stand with the codefendant' s unwillingness to do so.

The trial judge in~

made matters worse with an instruction that admonished the
jury to not disregard the testimony of the co-defendant whic'
had the effect of incriminating the other co-defendant who

had faile1 ta

testi~y.

The nature of the prejudicial comments in ~
differs significantly from the statement made in the instant;
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case.

Subsequent cases have distinguished

Delun~

and held

thi.lt comments on the defendant's failure to testify are not
always reversible error.

Certainly the inference to be

drawn from a comment on the defendant's failure to testify
is

~Jl!Lstar.tially

s c:::onger than the in£er2ncc which Flight b2

drawn from simply calling defendant to the stand; yet the
courts have determined that even comments made in certain
instances are not prejudicial error.
In United States v. Alpern, 564 F. 2d 755 (7th Cir.
1977), citing the case of United States v. Hutul, 416 F. 2d
607 (7th Cir. 19 69) , the court distinguished Deluna and held
that counsel's comrnent created no reversible error.

In

Alpern, as in Hutul, the court said that counsel's comment on
defendant's failure to take the stand was but an:
isolated and oblique reference
to his co-defendant's failure to take the
stand having no prejudicial effect that
could not be curved by the cautionary
instructions given in this case."
Id. at 761.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has distinguished its
decision in Deluna, limiting Deluna to its facts, i.e., to

theories o::= defense.
same view of D=luna's
S~tes v. Hine~,

Other jurisdictions have taken the
precedential value.

E.q. UnitPn

455 F. -2d 1317 (U.S. App. D.C. 1972) cert denied,
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406 U.S. 969; United States v. Shuford, 454 F. 2d 772
(4th Cir. 1971).

Further, the Fifth Circuit

distingui~~

Deluna in the case of United States v. Washington, 550

F.~

320 (5th Cir. 1977) where, unlike Deluna, coITLments regardir
defendant's failure to testify were made merely in th 2
summation of facts and no reversible error was found.
In a still more recent case, United States v.
572 F.

2d 1390

(6th Cir. 1978), the

Sixth Circuit distingc'

Deluna on the basis that comment made by the co-defendant i:.
argument regarding defendant's failure to testify was (1)
isolated and ( 2) not the result of any conduct on the part
of the prosecution and (3)

that the court instruction to th'

jury cured any error.
At the trial of the present case, no comment was
made on appellant's failure to testify.

Appellant was simpl

called to the stand and exercising his privilege, chose to
remain silent.

No comment on appellant's failure to testif1

was made in the presence of the jury.
Section 77-31-6, u.c.A.

(1953 as amended) provides

fo~ a joint trial o~ t~o or more defendants c~arg0~ wici 1 ~·

same offense unless the trial court uses its discretion to '
sever.

On review, the general test for error turns upoo

whether or not the record of the case at hand reflects an
urah
See State v. Rivenburgh, 11 °
abuse of that discretion.
2d 95, 355 P.

2d 689, 698

.,

I

i

I

(1960); State v. Lybert, 30 Utah
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l80 515 P.

2c1 441,

'142

(1973); and Statr:= v. Gaxiola, 550

P. 2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
This Court in State v. Gaxiola, 550 P. 2d 1298
(Utah

1976), upheld the trial court's denial of co-defendant's

antagonistic defense.
prosecuted for murder.

In Gaxiola, co-defendants were jointly
This Court said:

"Since a demand for severance is not
a matter of right, it must appear the
trial court had before it facts which
would indicate defendant would be unduly
prejudiced before this court can hold that
there had been an abuse of discretion."
Id. at 1301.
Section 77-42-1 U.C.A (1953 as amended) requires that
errors which do not affect substantial rights of the parties
be disregarded.

P. 2d 639

(1970).

See State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468
In the event error has been corrmi.itted, i t

is not presumed to have resulted in prejudice and the Court
must be satisfied the error had a

prejudicial effect before

it is warranted in reversing the judgment.
This court in State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517

1.: Hodges,

the prose>c'..l~ing attor:;.ey inquired as to whether

~e defendant, on trial for robbery and assault with a deadly

weapon, had used the same gun to perpetrate another robbery.
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The court sustained defendant's counsel's objection but
denied his motion for severance, and admonished the jury

~r

base its verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial.
In support of its decision not to reverse, this

Courts~~

. there should be no reversal of
a conviction merely because of error or
irregularity, but only if it is substantial
and prejudicial in the sense that in its
absence there is a reasonable likelihood
that there would have been a different
result."
(Emphases added)
Id. at 1325.
Thus, according to Gaxiola, absent a showing of
actual prejudice to appellant and absent a showing of a
reasonable likelihood that there would have been a

differe~'.

result, Hodges, the trial court's denial of appellant's
motion for severance and/or mistrial should be upheld by
this Court.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR NOR
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

I

II

Appellant filed a motion for new trial on the grou:jI

cal2.€:d '!:o -:.esti.

Appellant cites U.C.A. 77-44-5 (1953) which state:i
that a defendant's failure or refusal to testify "shall not
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in any manner prejudice him or be used against him on the
trial or proceeding."
In the instant case, appellant was not prejudiced
by his exercise of his right to silence.

co:"..--:-,en.:: 11ccE-= tJ the eff2ct that

testify.

he~

fai~cd

There was no
to co:n..e forth a.:h. 1.

lvhether he was cal led by co-defendant or a prosecutor

and refused to take the stand creates no more prejudice
towards him than if he were to sit there in silence.

In

either instance the jurors are aware of the fact that he
has not testified.

The jurors in this case were admonished by

the trial court that a defendant could not be called to the
stand involuntarily and that his failure to testify is not
an admission of guilt nor can it be used against him.
As appellant points out, this Court in State v.
Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P. 2d 639
position that

~hen

(1970), adopted the

a fundamental constitutional right has been

abused or denied, any error pertaining thereto is presumed
to be prejudicial.

However, this Court went on to state

lliat the error is not prejudicial per se since there are

right could have no possible bearing on any unfairn2ss or

~position upon the defendant or upon a correct determination
of his guilt or innocence.
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For example, in the case of United States v.
Sigal, 572 F. 2d 1320

(9th Cir. 1978)

the court concluded

that certain comments made by the prosecution, taken on
face value as the court assumed the jury would take them,
constituted a comElent on defend.ant's failure to

testi~y

thus was an error of constitutional dimension.

However,

a":

citing Chapman v. California, the Court stated that automatic
reversal does not result if the error can be said to have be'
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court decided

t~

by applying the test set forth in Anderson v. Nelson, wherei:.
the court said that such a comment was reversible error wher.
"such comment is extensive, where an inference of guilt fro:
silence is stressed to the jury as a basis of conviction,
and where there is evidence that could have been supported
acquittal."

The court in Sigal determined the error to be

harmless and stated:
"Here the comment was not extensive,
there was minimal stress on any inference
of guilt to be drawn by the jury from
the silence, and there was no substantial
evidence which supported an acquittal."
Id.
at 1323.
Thus, as tD.e colL:Ct in Sic;o.l

c.~rnunst.ra ted,

even

error determined to be of constitutional significance a~
so presumably prejudicial can be harmless error and not
prejudicial as appellant contends.
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As illustrated in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d
202, 468 P.

2d 639

(1970),

this presurnption can be overcome

when the court is "convinced beyond a reasonable doubt"
that it had no such prejudicial effect upon the proceedings.

"Correlative to this it is also
true that when the guilt is shown by
other untainted evidence so overwhelming that there is no likelihood
whatsoever of a different result in
the absence of such error or irregularity, there should be no reversal."
Id.
at p. 643 (Emphasis added)
Respondent submits that this is the case here.
Absent the likelihood of a different result had the appellant
oot been called by counsel for Morishita, the ruling of
the trial court denying appellant's motion for a new trial
should be upheld.
POINT III.
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
FUNDAI1ENTAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY A
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY IN THAT
THE TRIAL COURT ADMONISHED THE
JURY TO DISREGARD THE ACTIONS OF
CO'"iS?:S FO? l'O?.IS'1IT1\ IN CALLHFC:
Appellant claims that the tridl court's failure to
9Unt his motions for severance or a new trial deprived
him of a fundamental constitutional right--the right to be
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tried before an impartial jury.

Appellant claims that the

inferences to be drawn from his refusal to take the

s~~

after being called by counsel for co-defendcrnt Morishita
prejudiced the jury as to appellant.
Appellant cites State v. Scandrett, 24 Ui:ah 2u 2o;,
468 P. 2d 639

(1970) decided by this Court, as setting forth

the standard of review for an alleged violation of a
fundamental constitutional right.

In Scandrett, this Court

stated that there is a presumption that error violating a
constitutional right is prejudicial but further stated that
such presumption can be overcome when the court is convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that the error had no such prejudici;
effect upon the proceedings.
Appellant was not denied a trial by an
jury.

imparti~

Even if respondent were to concede that the calling o'
I

I

appellant to the stand by counsel for co-defendant Morishit1
was improper, the court prevented any prejudice to the appell'
arising out of that incident by admonishing the jury to
disregard it.

this court stated that there is not reversible error if
comment is made regarding the failure of an accused to tesfr
so long as the court admonishes the jury to disregard t~
same.

Here we do not have comments but merely the callino

I
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I

appellant to the stand.

The court admonished the jury to

disregard the same and the appellant was not prejudiced
thereby.

In the case at bar, appellant was tried by a fair

error during the proceedings, appellant suffered no deprivation
or denial of a fundamental constitutional right.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectully submits that in view of the
arguments presented above, the appellant's conviction should
be

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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